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Abstract As countries worldwide attempt to address a series of global and domestic environmental challenges, the
pollution haven effect remains an ongoing concern among trade and environment researchers and policymakers. This
paper examines the pollution haven effect in the context of global value chains using inter-country input-output data
at the manufacturing industry level from 1995-2009. This paper pays special attention to the issue of “doublecounting” caused by intermediate trade. The analysis utilizes two outsourcing measures and two revealed comparative
advantage measures appropriate for analyzing global value chains. I propose women’s political power as a novel
instrumental variable to address the endogeneity of environmental regulation. Regression results show that more
stringent environmental policies are not a significant determinant of manufacturing outsourcing and competitiveness
in global value chains. At the same time, women’s political power is associated with more stringent environmental
policies.
Keywords Environmental policy, Pollution haven effect, Global value chains, Outsourcing
JEL Codes Q56, Q58, F18, F12, F14
1. Introduction
As countries worldwide attempt to address a series of pressing global and domestic environmental challenges, the
pollution haven effect remains an ongoing concern among trade and environment scholars and policymakers. In theory
(Copeland and Taylor 1994; 2003), more stringent environmental regulations can increase the production cost of
pollution-intensive (“dirty”) goods. Thus, countries with more stringent regulations will face a comparative
disadvantage in “dirty” goods, while those with less strict regulations will face a comparative advantage. If
environmental regulations are a pivotal determinant of the volume and direction of trade, countries with less stringent
regulations will specialize more in “dirty” goods and become pollution havens. For policymakers, the main concern
is a trade-off between environmental protection and the economic benefits associated with pollution-intensive
activities. If the pollution haven effect is significant, it could deter policymakers from tightening environmental
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policies, resulting in sub-optimal environmental protection in a country (Jaffe, Peterson, Portney and Stavins 1995;
Dechezlepretre and Sato 2017).
Since the 1980s (McGuire 1982; Kalt 1988), empirical studies of the pollution haven effect have focused on two main
questions. First, is there a pollution haven effect? Second, are environmental regulations strong enough to
fundamentally alter or even reverse the pattern of trade of “dirty” goods? Or are they weaker than the other
determinants of trade such that we can only detect a pollution haven effect at the margin (Copeland, Shapiro and
Taylor 2021)? Ederington and Minier (2003) and Levinson and Taylor (2008) found that higher pollution abatement
costs in the U.S. were associated with higher net imports of “dirty” goods. Ederington, Levinson and Minier (2005)
found that domestic pollution abatement costs had a statistically significant and positive effect on the U.S.’s net
imports of pollution-intensive goods from low-income and low-standard countries. They also found that pollutionintensive industries tended to be less mobile, making it more costly to relocate when domestic environmental
regulations became more stringent. Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) found that the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol
increased the committed countries’ imports from non-committed countries. However, in Branger, Quirion and
Chevallier (2016), a higher carbon price in the E.U. Emissions Trading System had no significant effect on the net
imports of steel and cement. Similarly, in Naegele and Zaklan (2019), higher emission costs in the E.U. ETS did not
cause a shift of manufacturing activities from regions with stronger regulations to regions with weaker regulations.
Since the 1970s, enabled by trade liberalization and more efficient communication and transportation technologies,
firms can fragment their production process and outsource one or more stages to foreign countries with lower
production costs. Production fragmentation and outsourcing have led to complex production networks that span
multiple countries, i.e., global value chains. 2 The rise of global value chains has some important implications for
studying the pollution haven effect. First, it makes the pollution haven effect more subtle. To circumvent domestic
environmental regulations or avoid paying pollution abatement costs, firms only need to outsource the “dirtier”
production stages impacted more by domestic environmental regulations instead of relocating their entire production
to foreign countries (Cherniwchan, Copeland and Taylor 2017).
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goods had increased rapidly since the early 1990s. Los, Timmer and de Vries (2015) showed that international
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Second, it makes traditional trade measures less suitable for testing the pollution haven effect. It is well known that
traditional trade measures such as gross and net exports “double-count” the value of intermediate goods that cross
borders more than once (Johnson and Noguera 2012; Koopman, Wang and Wei 2014). As global value chains become
more prevalent (Johnson and Noguera 2017), traditional trade measures will suffer more from “double-counting,”
making it more problematic to use them in global value chain analysis. In global value chains, a country with large
exports of “dirty” final goods may not be a pollution haven if it has outsourced most of the pollution-intensive
intermediate production stages to foreign countries. Similarly, a country that imports many “dirty” final goods may
be a pollution haven if it produces and exports a large volume of “dirty” intermediate goods.
Third, in global value chains, producing a “dirty” final good can indirectly involve production stages that take place
overseas. To fully assess the pollution haven effect in global value chains, we need to trace all domestic and foreign
activities directly and indirectly required to produce a final good.
Building on current literature, this paper examines the pollution haven effect in the context of global value chains. I
constructed two foreign outsourcing measures and two revealed comparative advantage measures using panel data
from the WIOD during 1995-2009. Environmental regulations are proxied by the OECD EPS Index. I use three
econometric specifications to assess whether more stringent environmental policies are associated with more
outsourcing or lower revealed comparative advantage of manufacturing industries. Bias can arise due to unobserved
heterogeneity and the endogeneity of environmental regulations. I address unobserved heterogeneity with a set of
time-variant and invariant fixed effects. And I propose a novel instrumental variable that measures women’s political
power for dealing with the endogeneity of environmental regulations. In addition to regressions with the full sample,
I use two subsamples of 1995-2000 and 2004-2009 to check robustness. Overall, the regression results do not show a
significant pollution haven effect at the industry level in global value chains.
The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, this paper uses two outsourcing and two revealed comparative
advantage measures more appropriate in the context of global value chains. Specifically, all the measures fully account
for the “double-counting” issue caused by production fragmentation, intermediate trade, and the direct and indirect
linkages of production activities in global value chains. Second, I use a novel instrumental variable to deal with the
endogeneity of environmental regulations. The IV – women’s political power – is measured by the percentage of seats
held by women in the lower or single chamber of a country’s national parliament. Recent studies show that women
have a stronger preference for environmental protection, and the stringency of a country’s environmental policy
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significantly correlates with women’s representation in politics. And we can use fixed effects to control for the other
paths by which women’s political power can impact trade outcomes. Third, this paper extends the scope of analysis
to the world economy instead of focusing on a single country. Pollution haven studies that focus on a single country
may not reflect the full dynamics in global value chains. Most importantly, after a country outsources its production
to another country in a global value chain, the latter can further outsource its production to a third country, and so on.
Without considering the full dynamics of outsourcing in an industry’s whole global value chain, we risk overestimating
or underestimating the extent of outsourcing between two trade partner countries. This paper addresses this issue by
using inter-country input-output table data that covers the entire global economy.
This paper is closely related to several recent studies on the impact of environmental policies on trade in global value
chains. Clark, Marchese and Zarrilli (2000) found that industries in the U.S. with high pollution abatement costs were
less likely to offshore their assembly operations to developing countries. Using input-output data, Levinson (2010)
showed that we would significantly underestimate the pollution content of U.S. imports if we do not fully consider
the impact of intermediate trade. Cole, Elliott and Okubo (2014) found that Japanese firms adopting environmental
management-type practices were more likely to outsource operations to countries without such practices. Kozluk and
Timiliotis (2016) found that although more stringent environmental policies would lower a country’s gross
manufacturing exports, they were not a strong determinant of export patterns. Antonietti, de Marchi and di Maria
(2017) found that as domestic environmental policies became more stringent, Italian manufacturing firms were more
likely to outsource their production to developing countries. Cherniwchan (2017) examined the impact of trade
liberalization on air emissions generated by U.S. manufacturing plants. Regression results show that lower tariffs on
pollution-intensive intermediate imports from Mexico are associated with lower PM10 and SO2 emissions per worker
of manufacturing plants. Ben-David, Kleimeier and Viehs (2018) found that more stringent domestic environmental
regulations would lower a firm’s self-reported domestic CO2 emissions but increase its foreign emissions.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the data sources and the construction of relevant
variables. Section 3 describes the econometric specifications and the strategy for dealing with bias caused by
unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity associated with environmental policies. Section 4 presents and discusses
the regression results. Section 5 contains conclusions, policy implications, and further research questions.
2. Data and methods
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The primary data sources include the World Input-Output Database (WIOD), the OECD Environmental Policy
Stringency Index, and the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s Historical Data on Women in National Parliaments. The period
of the analysis is 1995 to 2009. The paper focuses on 14 aggregated manufacturing industries. 3 This section explains
the construction of variables used for testing the pollution haven effect in global value chains.
2.1 Production fragmentation and outsourcing
Feenstra and Hanson (1996; 1999) offered a straightforward method of measuring international production
fragmentation and outsourcing. Using data on intermediate trade, they measured foreign outsourcing as the share of
foreign intermediate inputs in an industry’s total use of intermediates inputs. A higher share indicates more foreign
outsourcing. Feenstra and Hanson developed two versions of the measurement. The broad version considers all foreign
intermediate inputs, while the narrow version only considers foreign intermediate inputs purchased from the same
industry. The idea behind the narrow measure is that foreign outsourcing is the overseas transfer of production
activities that a product could have performed domestically. Thus, when a firm relies more on foreign intermediate
inputs from the same industry, it signals more outsourcing. Similarly, Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) measured
international production fragmentation as the amount of foreign intermediate inputs used to produce a country’s
exports.
The recent development of inter-country input-output tables (ICIO) significantly improved the empirical research of
global value chains (Tukker and Dietzenbacher 2013; Inomata 2014). Most importantly, ICIO allows researchers to
track the value-added flow from where it is created to where it is absorbed in the final demand (Johnson and Noguera
2012; 2017). In global value chains, because production can cross borders multiple times, a country’s imports of
intermediate inputs may contain value-added created in the importing country itself, or value-added created in a third
country. To fully account for this situation, Los, Timmer and de Vries (2015) traced all domestic and foreign value-
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adding activities directly and indirectly required to produce an industry’s final good and measured international
production fragmentation as the share of foreign value-added in the value of an industry’s final good.
In this paper, I construct a measure of outsourcing based on Feenstra and Hanson (1996; 1999), Los, Timmer and de
Vries (2015) and Johnson and Noguera (2012; 2017). First, I decompose the value of an industry’s final good into the
value added by all domestic and foreign activities directly and indirectly required to produce the final good:
Yjd = ∑i∑oViojd. ⋯ (1)

In Equation (1), Yjd is the value of the final good of industry j of country d. Viojd is the value-added that originates from
industry i of country o. Second, I measure outsourcing as the share of foreign value-added from the same industry in
the value of an industry’s final good:
OUTjd = 100 × (∑o≠dVjojd)/Yjd. ⋯ (2)

In Equation (2), ∑o≠dVjojd represents total foreign value-added from the same industry as the final good. We can
consider OUTjd as a revised narrow measure in the spirit of Feenstra and Hanson (1996; 1999). I use the input-output
tables in the WIOD (1995-2009) to calculate the two measures defined in Equation (1) and Equation (2). 4
2.2 Revealed comparative advantage
Another critical policy question is how environmental regulations impact a country’s competitiveness in global value
chains. The revealed comparative advantage (RCA) index has been used widely to indicate a country’s ability to
produce a good relative to all other countries in the global economy. Balassa (1965) first conceptualized the index,
and constructed it as the ratio of a country’s share of world exports of a particular product and the country’s share of
overall world exports. An index value above one is considered an indicator that the country has a revealed comparative
advantage in that product (French 2017). 5
Some recent literature has examined the impact of environmental regulations on a country’s revealed comparative
advantage in pollution-intensive goods. Using data from twenty-five OECD countries and nine major East Asian
developing countries during 1965-1995, Xu (2000) found no systematic changes in trade patterns over time. Grether
and de Melo (2004) examined twenty-two high-income countries and thirty less-developed countries between 1981
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Because trade is determined by many factors (such as trade policies), a country’s revealed comparative advantage

does not necessarily reflect its comparative advantage as determined by factor endowment.
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and 1998. They found that the RCA of less-developed countries has increased in four polluting industries, including
pulp and paper, industrial chemicals, nonmetallic minerals, and iron and steel. Cole, Elliott and Shimamoto (2005)
examined the RCA of U.S. manufacturing industries between 1978 and 1994 and found no systemic evidence that the
U.S.’s specialization in pollution-intensive industries had declined. They also showed that the U.S.’s competitive
advantage in human and physical capital-intensive industries offsets the negative impact of environmental regulations
on the U.S.’s RCA in pollution-intensive industries. Marconi (2012) studied the bilateral RCA between fourteen E.U.
countries and China during 1999-2006 and found that the E.U. countries had kept or improved their advantages in
water and air-polluting industries, while their advantages in cleaner industries had declined. One possible explanation
is that cleaner industries are more mobile than pollution-intensive industries, implying that industrial mobility may
significantly impact specialization more than environmental policies. Sauvage (2014) analyzed the RCA of twentysix OECD countries in environmental goods between 2002 and 2012 and found that more stringent environmental
policies could increase a country’s export of environmental goods.
In all the studies mentioned above, the RCA index is based on gross exports. However, because of production
fragmentation and double-counting of intermediate inputs that cross borders more than once, a country’s RCA in gross
exports is no longer reflective of a country’s actual specialization in global value chains. Koopman, Wang and Wei
(2014) showed that a country’s RCA in value-added trade could drastically differ from its RCA in gross exports.
Therefore, when examining the impact of environmental regulations on specialization in global value chains, we must
first filter out the distortion caused by the double-counting of intermediate trade.
In this paper, I use ICIO data from the WIOD to construct two RCA indices at the country × industry level. The first
RCA index is based on factor income earned in global value chains (Timmer, Los, Stehrer, de Vries and Pijoan-Mas
2013). In Equation (1), Viojd is the value-added created by industry i of country o and absorbed in the final good of
industry j of country d. Because value-added accrue as income to the labor or capital factors employed in industry i
of country o, we can calculate country o’s total factor income earned from industry j by adding up Viojd by i and d.
Then, the income-based RCA index can be calculated as:
RCAINCjo = 100 × (INCjo/∑oINCjo)/(∑jINCjo/∑j∑oINCjo). ⋯ (3)

In Equation (3), INCjo=∑i∑dViojd is country o’s total factor income from industry j. ∑oINCjo is the world’s total factor
income from industry j. ∑jINCjo is country o’s total factor income from all industries. ∑j∑oINCjo is the world’s overall
factor income. The index is scaled by 100. An index value above 100 means that country o derives a larger share of
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factor income from industry j relative to all other countries, implying a revealed comparative advantage in activities
directly and indirectly required to produce industry j’s final good.
Following Koopman, Wang and Wei (2014) and Borin and Mancini (2019), I calculate the second RCA index based
on the net domestic value-added in a country’s gross exports. In global value chains, a country’s gross exports embody
both domestic and foreign value-added. And due to the border crossing of intermediate inputs, both domestic and
foreign value-added will suffer from double-counting. Thus, net domestic value-added is the domestic value-added in
a country’s gross exports net of the double-counted value. Then, we can construct the second RCA index as:
RCADVAjo = 100 × (NDVAjo/∑oNDVAjo)/(∑jNDVAjo/∑j∑oNDVAjo). ⋯ (4)

In Equation (4), NDVAjo is the net domestic value-added in industry j of country o’s gross exports. ∑oNDVAjo is the
net domestic value-added in all countries’ export of industry j. ∑jDVAjo is the net domestic value-added in country o’s
overall exports. ∑j∑oDVAjo is the net domestic value-added in the world’s overall exports. When the index is above
100, we can consider the country as having a revealed comparative advantage in the export of industry j.
2.3 Environmental policy stringency
There are several conceptual and empirical challenges when measuring the stringency of environmental policies (Botta
and Kozluk 2014; Brunel and Levinson 2016). A single measure of stringency (such as the presence of a specific type
of environmental policy in a country) may not capture the multidimensionality of environmental regulations. Although
two countries adopt similar environmental policies, the strictness can differ between the two countries. For instance,
a policy regulating a pollution-intensive industry will appear more stringent in countries with a larger share of that
industry. By contrast, a policy that exempts older firms will appear less stringent in countries with more old firms.
More importantly, simultaneity, omitted variables, and unobserved heterogeneity can cause endogeneity in the
environmental policy variable, leading to biased estimation results.
I use the OECD Environmental Policy Stringency (EPS) index to proxy environmental regulations in this paper. 6
Constrained by data availability in the WIOD, the EPS index used is from twenty-six OECD countries and six nonOECD countries between 1995 and 2009. The EPS index is built in two septs. First, the stringency of a group of
market and non-market environmental regulatory instruments is evaluated on a scale of 0 to 6, with higher numbers
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being more stringent. Then, the individual indices are combined into a composite index on the same scale. The
composite index captures the multidimensionality of environmental regulations. The EPS index focuses on
environmental regulations that mainly impact the transportation and energy sectors. Although transportation and
energy do not represent the whole economy, there are advantages in focusing on these two sectors. Because
transportation and energy are upstream in all manufacturing production, they are present in all industrialized and
industrializing countries and are of comparable economic importance across countries. Moreover, both sectors tend to
be pollution-intensive in all countries and are subject to an identifiable and comparable set of environmental regulatory
instruments (Botta and Kozluk 2014).
3. Econometric specifications
3.1 Baseline specifications
I define three econometric specifications to examine the impact of environmental regulations on manufacturing
outsourcing in global value chains.
The first specification is akin to an empirical gravity equation (Aichele and Felbermayr 2015; Naegele and Zaklan
2019):
𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = exp �𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 × �

𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
× 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 � + 𝜐𝜐𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 + 𝜐𝜐𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜐𝜐𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜐𝜐𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 � + 𝜖𝜖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 . … (5)
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜

In Equation (5), subscript j indicates a manufacturing industry. o indicates the origin country where value is created.
d is the destination country where value is absorbed in the final goods (o≠d). t indicates year. The dependent variable
𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 represents the value in the final good of industry j of country d that originates from the same industry of country
o.

EPSd and EPSo are the OECD environmental policy stringency index of country d and country o, respectively. The
ratio

𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑜𝑜

captures the relative stringency of environmental policies between the two countries. Suppose the pollution

haven effect exists in global value chains. In that case, we should expect polluting industries in country d to outsource
more to country o, as country d’s environmental policies become more stringent relative to country o.
However, different industries would have heterogeneous responses to the same national environmental policies.
Because pollution-intensive industries depend more on polluting activities, we expect them to have a higher incentive
to seek out “pollution havens” when domestic environmental regulations become more stringent. One way to address
this heterogeneity is to interact the country-level environmental policy stringency with a variable that captures the
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pollution characteristics at the industry level. 7 In this paper,

𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑜𝑜

is interacted with the share of air emission-generating

energy in the total energy use of industry j of the rest of the world (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗 ). 8 To fully describe all flows in the world

economy, the WIOD models countries not covered by the main input-output data as an aggregated rest-of-the-world

region and provides energy use data at the industry level (Timmer, Dietzenbacher, Los, Stehrer and de Vries 2015).
The advantage of using EMROWj as part of the interaction term is twofold. First, because countries both compete and
connect in global value chains, the percentage of air emission-generating energy in total energy use in the rest of the
world will be correlated with the measure of the in-sample countries. Thus it is an appropriate indicator of the
environmental characteristics of manufacturing industries in global value chains. Second, because the rest-of-theworld countries are not in the sample, there is a lower chance of introducing endogeneity into the econometric model.
Based on Equation (5), a positive coefficient β would mean that as environmental policies in country d get more
stringent relative to country o, more emission-intensive industries will outsource more to country o. 9
In Equation (5), the purpose of including fixed effects is to capture time-variant and invariant factors that can impact
global outsourcing. 𝜐𝜐𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 captures all time-variant origin-and-destination country-pair factors. Time-variant industry-

level specific factors in the origin or destination countries are captured by 𝜐𝜐𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 or 𝜐𝜐𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , respectively. Time-invariant
factors of bilateral trade are captured by 𝜐𝜐𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 . 10 The fixed effects help address unobserved heterogeneity and omitted

variables that correlate with bilateral trade and environmental policies. They also control for trade barriers between

each country and their trade partners (“multilateral resistance”). They can also correct for year-to-year price changes
without introducing bias (Baldwin and Taglioni 2007).
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and Lochard (2017) interacted the country-level environmental policy with the industry-level pollution intensity
(pollution per unit of output) or energy intensity (energy use per unit of output).
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Energy use data is from the WIOD’s environmental accounts (Genty, Arto and Neuwahl 2012). Energy use that does

not generate air emissions includes electricity, heat, nuclear, hydroelectric, geothermal, solar, wind power, and other
sources.
9

Chung (2014) argued that the interaction term identified the sources of comparative advantage in a difference-in-

differences type strategy.
10

The final dataset comprises 30 countries, 14 aggregated manufacturing industries, and 15 time periods (1995-2009).
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The second specification is:
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 × �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 � + 𝜐𝜐𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜐𝜐𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜐𝜐𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜖𝜖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 . … (6)

In Equation (6), the dependent variable 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 represents foreign value-added as a percentage of the value of the final
good of industry j of country d. It is necessary to note that the variable only considers foreign value-added from the

same industry as the final good. The key independent variable 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗 is the interaction between country
d’s EPS index and the share of air emission-generating energy in the total energy use of industry j of the rest of the

world. A positive coefficient β would mean that as environmental policies in country d get more stringent,
manufacturing industries that are more emission-intensive would outsource more to the other countries in global value
chains. The specification in Equation (6) also includes several fixed effects to control for time-variant and invariant
factors that could influence industry j of country d’s outsourcing in global value chains: 𝜐𝜐𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 captures time-variant

factors specific to country d; 𝜐𝜐𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 captures time-variant factors specific to industry j; time-invariant factors are captured

by 𝜐𝜐𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 .

The third specification focuses on revealed comparative advantage:
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 =

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − 100
= 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 × �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 � + 𝜐𝜐𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 + 𝜐𝜐𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜐𝜐𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜖𝜖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 . … (7)
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 100

In Equation (7), 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is either the factor income-based RCA index defined in Equation (3) or the domestic value-

added-based RCA index defined in Equation (4). Because the original RCA indices take values between 0 and infinity,

using them as regression dependent variables will give too much weight to RCA values above 100. After the
transformation (RCA-100)/(RCA+100), the dependent variable will take values between negative and positive 100,
and thus regressions using the transformed index will treat all RCA values symmetrically (Cole, Elliott and Shimamoto
2005).
The key independent variable 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑜𝑜 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗 is the interaction between country o’s EPS index and the share of air
emission-generating energy in the total energy use of industry j of the rest of the world. Equation (7) also includes a
set of fixed effects similar to those in Equation (6) to control for time-variant and invariant factors that can impact a
country’s manufacturing revealed comparative advantage in global value chains.
3.2 Endogeneity and instrumental variable
The endogeneity of the environmental policy independent variable is a major concern among pollution haven effect
researchers (Cole, Elliott and Fredriksson, 2006; Levinson and Taylor 2008; Brunel and Levinson 2016; Millimet and
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Roy 2016). One reason for endogeneity is the unobservable industry or country-specific factors that correlate with an
industry’s propensity to export (or outsource) and pollute. The panel data allows us to deal with unobserved
heterogeneity by including multiple time-variant and invariant fixed effects.
Another main source of endogeneity is simultaneity. In empirical tests of the pollution haven effect, the independent
variable of interest is usually some environmental policy measure, and the dependent variable is typically some
measure of trade. Exogeneity of the independent variable requires that the impact of environmental policies on trade
is unidirectional. But international trade may also impact environmental regulations, causing simultaneity between the
dependent and independent variables (Eliste and Fredriksson 2002; Cole, Elliott and Fredriksson 2006; Levinson and
Taylor 2008). For instance, in major exporting countries of pollution-intensive goods, the government may be reluctant
to enact stringent environmental regulations due to political pressures from the pollution-intensive industries.
Researchers have utilized quasi-natural experiments and instrumental variables to deal with simultaneity. However,
quasi-experiments are rare in economics, and valid instrumental variables that meet both the correlation requirement
and the exclusion restriction are hard to find.
In this paper, due to simultaneity, international outsourcing can influence the stringency of environmental regulations
in both the origin and destination countries (EPSo and EPSd, respectively). This paper proposes a novel instrumental
variable to mitigate the simultaneity issue associated with environmental policies – the percentage of seats held by
women members in the single or lower chamber of a country’s parliament (WOMENo or WOMENd). Studies show
that women tend to have greater environmental concerns than men. They tend to participate more in pro-environmental
activities, convey better scientific knowledge of climate change, have stronger pro-environmental attitudes, perceive
environmental problems that pose health and safety risks as more serious, and prefer more robust environmental
protection from the government (McCright 2010; McCright and Xiao 2014; Xiao and McCright 2015). Economists
play important roles in the making of environmental policies. Surveys of economists in the U.S. and Europe show that
female economists prefer environmental protection more than male economists (May, McGarvey and Whaples 2014;
May, McGarvey and Kucera 2018).
Furthermore, women’s representation in national parliaments can lead countries to adopt more stringent environmental
policies (Fredriksson and Wang 2011; Mavisakalyan and Tarverdi 2019; Atchison and Down 2019; Ramstetter and
Habersack 2020). Therefore, conditional on other factors, the percentage of parliament seats held by women will
strongly correlate with the stringency of environmental policies, thus meeting the requirement that changes in the IV
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are associated with changes in the endogenous variable. 11 However, as always, satisfying the exclusion restriction is
more challenging. In the case of the proposed IV here, there are reasons to believe that women’s representation in
national parliaments may impact trade through other paths. Since we use panel data in this paper, we can control for
the other paths by including a set of time-variant and time-invariant fixed effects, which help with lessening the chance
that the IV fails to satisfy the exclusion restriction.
In what follows, the percentage of seats held by women members in the single or lower chamber of a country’s
parliament (WOMENo or WOMENd) will be used to construct relevant I.V.s for different econometric specifications.
4. Results and discussions
This section presents and discusses estimation results from the three econometric specifications defined in Section
3. 12
4.1 Outsourcing
Table 1 shows the estimation results of the empirical gravity model defined in Equation (5). The model is estimated
by the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator, and robust standard errors are two-way clustered by
industry and country pair to account for serial correlation within the panel. Although the Poisson estimator is often
used to fit count data, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) showed that PPML could also fit a variety of non-negative
and non-count data and generate consistent estimations robust to different patterns of heteroscedasticity. In addition,
in the case of trade data, a major challenge is the presence of a large proportion of zero bilateral trade flows. When
taking the logarithm of trade flows, researchers have resorted to several unsatisfactory solutions. By contrast, the
PPML estimator provides a natural way to deal with zero trades. For these reasons, the PPML estimator has been
widely used to estimate gravity models. Because the gravity model defined in Equation (5) contains multi-way fixed
effects, the ppmlhdfe statistical package developed by Correia, Guimarães and Zylkin (2020; 2021) is used.
Table 1
We first discuss estimation results using the full sample. In Column (1), the dependent variable Vjojd is the value of an
industry’s final good that originates from the same industry in a foreign country. The regression coefficient shows that

11

Appendix A Figure A2 shows the percentage of women parliamentarians for the countries in the final sample. It can

be seen that all countries are having more women in national parliaments between 1995 and 2009.
12

Due to the space limit, descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix A.
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the relative stringency of environmental policies between two countries does not significantly affect outsourcing in
global value chains.
The following two columns show instrumental variable regression results. The instrumental variable for the
independent variable is (WOMENdt/WOMENot)×EMROWjt. As detailed in Section 3.2, WOMENdt/WOMENot is the
ratio of the percentage of seats held by women in the national parliament between the destination country and origin
country. Results of the first-stage regression are reported in Column (2). The results show that the ratio of women’s
representation in national parliament has a positive and statistically significant effect on the relative environmental
policy stringency between the two countries. After standardization, a one standard deviation increase in the relative
representation of women in national parliament will result in an expected increase in the relative stringency of
environmental regulations by 0.0437 of its standard deviation. Second-stage regression results are reported in Column
(3). Following the method suggested by Lin and Wooldridge (2019), the predicted overall error component from the
first stage (𝑒𝑒̂𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ) is used as the control function in the second stage. Although the IV regression shows a positive effect
of relative stringency of environmental policies on outsourcing, the effect is still statistically insignificant.

Additional regressions using two sub-samples (1995-2000 and 2004-2009) are performed to check robustness. The
results are shown in Table 1. The sub-samples are selected for these two periods to exclude the impacts of two major
global events between 2001 and 2003. First, Mainland China officially joined the World Trade Organization in 2001.
Second, most countries ratified the Kyoto Protocol between 2001 and 2003. These two events could introduce abrupt
changes to both global environmental policies and international trade patterns. Models in all three columns are
estimated with the same methods as in the full sample. The additional results further confirm the lack of a pollution
haven effect in global value chains. Although the effect of relative environmental policy stringency on outsourcing is
significant and positive in 1995-2000, it becomes insignificant in the IV regression in Column (3). By contrast, the
effect of women’s political representation on environmental policy stringency remains statistically significant and
positive in both sub-sample results.
Next, estimation results based on the specification in Equation (6) are shown in Table 2. The dependent variable
OUTjdt is the percentage of foreign value-added in the value of an industry’s final good. Because the model contains
multi-way fixed effects, the reghdfe statistical package developed by Correia (2017) is used for estimation. Robust
standard errors are two-way clustered by industry and country to account for serial correlation within the panel.
Table 2
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When the full sample is used, the estimation result in Column (1) shows that a country’s EPS index does not have a
statistically significant effect on the percentage of foreign value-added embodied in a country’s final goods. The
following two columns show results from the IV regression. Column (2) shows results from the first stage, in which
the interaction term WOMENdt×EMROWjt is used as IV for the endogenous variable. An interesting result is that
women’s representation in national parliaments has a significant and positive effect on a country’s EPS index. A one
standard deviation increase in the percentage of women parliamentarians will result in an expected increase in the
stringency of environmental regulations by 0.475 standard deviation. In Column (3), the second-stage regression
results again show that the stringency of environmental policies does not significantly impact the percentage of foreign
value-added embodied in manufacturing final goods, although the effect is positive. Table 2 also shows additional
regression results using the two subsamples of 1995-2000 and 2004-2009. The results are consistent with the finding
from the full sample.
4.2 Revealed comparative advantage
Table 3 shows the estimation results based on Equation (7). The dependent variable is either the transformed RCA
index based on factor incomes (RCAINCadjjot), or the transformed RCA index based on the net domestic value-added
in gross exports (RCADVAadjjot). Estimation utilizes the reghdfe statistical package developed by Correia (2017).
Robust standard errors are two-way clustered by industry and country.
Table 3
The pollution haven effect implies that stringent domestic environmental regulations could lower a country’s revealed
comparative advantage in pollution-intensive manufacturing industries. However, the results from the full sample in
Column (1) and Column (3) show no evidence that environmental regulations significantly impact a country’s
manufacturing RCA. Similarly, no significant effect is found from the IV regression results shown in Column (2) and
Column (4). 13 Two subsamples of 1995-2000 and 2004-2009 are used to check robustness, and the results confirm the
finding from the full sample.
4.3 Discussions
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Only results from the second stage are shown in Table 3 Column (2) and Column (4). The first-stage regression

results are omitted, because they are identical to Column (2) in Table 2.
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Overall, results from the regression analyses do not show robust evidence that the stringency of environmental policies
can significantly impact outsourcing and revealed comparative advantage in manufacturing industries in global value
chains. There are many reasons why we don’t find a pollution haven effect in international trade (Brunnermeier and
Levinson 2004). First, if the cost of complying with environmental regulations is only a small fraction of a polluting
firm’s total cost, but the relocation cost is high, the firm would have little incentive to relocate to countries with less
stringent regulations. Second, environmental regulations can motivate polluting firms to innovate (Porter and van der
Linde 1995). If the efficiency gain from innovations is large enough and the net gain from environmental regulations
is positive, firms will have little incentive to relocate. Third, regulators may offer subsidies to firms that can offset the
cost increase caused by environmental regulation. Fourth, other factors such as capital intensity, industrial mobility,
endowment, and trade policies may play a more important role in determining the pattern of trade in “dirty” goods.
5. Conclusions
This paper re-examines the pollution haven effect in global value chains using ICIO data of 1995-2009. A novel
instrumental variable – women’s political power – is used to address the endogeneity of environmental regulations,
and two sub-samples are used to check the robustness of the results. Overall, the regression results do not show that
the stringency of environmental regulations can significantly impact manufacturing outsourcing or a country’s
manufacturing competitiveness in global value chains. However, results from the first stage of the IV regressions show
that women’s political representation in a country’s national parliament has a positive and statistically significant
impact on the stringency of a country’s environmental policies.
The main policy implication of the research is threefold. First, policymakers are reluctant to tighten domestic
environmental regulations because doing so can potentially lower the competitiveness of domestic manufacturing
industries in the world market. This paper shows that environmental policy stringency is not a significant determinant
of trade patterns in global value chains. Second, it will be necessary to investigate what is truly preventing
policymakers from tightening domestic environmental policies. Third, the paper shows that women’s political
representation is associated with higher stringency of environmental policies. The implication is that social and
political reforms such as empowering women and promoting gender equality are essential to improve national and
global environmental protection.
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Table 1: Environmental policy stringency and outsourcing (foreign value-added): regression results
(1)
(2)
(3)
Vjojd
WOMENdt/WOMENot×EMROWjt
Vjojd
Full sample
EPSdt/EPSot×EMROWjdt
-0.00108
0.00520
(0.00119)
(0.0334)
WOMENdt/WOMENot×EMROWjt
0.0328***
(0.00316)
-0.00630
𝑒𝑒̂𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
(0.0335)
Observations
182207
182700
182207
1995-2000
EPSdt/EPSot×EMROWjdt
0.00748**
0.102
(0.00251)
(0.0626)
WOMENdt/WOMENot×EMROWjt
0.0144***
(0.00213)
-0.0942
𝑒𝑒̂𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
(0.0624)
Observations
72848
73080
72848
2004-2009
EPSdt/EPSot×EMROWjdt
0.000734
-0.00233
(0.00136)
(0.0273)
WOMENdt/WOMENot×EMROWjt
0.0457***
(0.00660)
0.00307
𝑒𝑒̂𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
(0.0275)
Observations
72848
73080
72848
Country pair-year FE
Industry-destination-year FE
Industry-origin-year FE
Industry-destination-origin FE
Origin-year FE
Destination-year FE
Industry-year FE

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Notes. Column 1 and Column 3: Dep Var = Value of final good originating from the same industry in a foreign
country. Column 2: Dep Var = Ratio of the percentage of women in national parliaments × percentage of air emissiongenerating energy in total energy use in the rest-of-the-world by industry. Observations that have missing values are
excluded. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by country pair × industry. Significance levels: * p <
0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 2: Environmental policy stringency and outsourcing (percentage of foreign value-added): regression results
(1)
(2)
(3)
OUTjdt
EPSdt×EMROWjt
OUTjdt
Full sample
EPSdt×EMROWjt
-0.00856
0.0783
(0.00943)
(0.0400)
WOMENdt×EMROWjt
0.0234***
(0.00452)
-0.0906*
𝑒𝑒̂𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
(0.0445)
Observations
6299
6300
6299
1995-2000
EPSdt×EMROWjt
-0.0106
0.157
(0.0159)
(0.0814)
WOMENdt×EMROWjt
0.0172***
(0.00255)
-0.184*
𝑒𝑒̂𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
(0.0834)
Observations
2520
2520
2520
2004-2009
EPSdt×EMROWjt
-0.00796
0.0315
(0.00600)
(0.0583)
WOMENdt×EMROWjt
0.0176***
(0.00392)
-0.0401
𝑒𝑒̂𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
(0.0592)
Observations
2519
2520
2519
Country-year FE
Industry-year FE
Industry-country FE

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Notes. Column 1 and Column 3: Dep Var = Percentage of foreign value-added from the same industry as the final
good. Column 2: Dep Var = Percentage of women in national parliaments × percentage of air emission-generating
energy in total energy use in the rest-of-the-world. Observations that have missing values are excluded. Robust
standard errors in parentheses are clustered by country × industry. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p
< 0.001.
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Table 3: Environmental policy stringency and revealed comparative advantage: regression results
Factor income-based
Net Domestic Value-based
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
RCAINCadjjot
RCAINCadjjot
RCADVAadjjot
RCADVAadjjot
Full sample
EPSot×EMROWjt
0.159
0.649
-0.00377
0.760
(0.0904)
(0.359)
(0.115)
(0.454)
-0.511
-0.796
𝑒𝑒̂𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
(0.357)
(0.441)
Observations
6285
6285
6289
6289
1995-2000
EPSot×EMROWjt
-0.0819
-0.454
-0.155
0.00537
(0.157)
(0.534)
(0.149)
(0.681)
0.410
-0.177
𝑒𝑒̂𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
(0.522)
(0.691)
Observations
2512
2512
2508
2508
2004-2009
EPSot×EMROWjt
0.0220
0.236
-0.0261
1.093
(0.0510)
(0.461)
(0.0745)
(0.617)
-0.217
-1.137
𝑒𝑒̂𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
(0.468)
(0.624)
Observations
2514
2514
2520
2520
Country-year FE
Industry-year FE
Industry-country FE

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Notes. Column 1 and Column 2: Dep Var = Transformed RCA index based on factor income in global value chains.
Column 3 and Column 4: Dep Var = Transformed RCA index based on net domestic value added in gross exports.
Observations that have missing values are excluded. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by country ×
industry. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Appendix A. Supplemental data and figures
Table A1: Descriptive statistics
Table 1 (full sample)
Vjojd
EPSdt/EPSot×EMROWjt
WOMENdt/WOMENot×EMROWjt
Table 1 (1995-2000)
Vjojd
EPSdt/EPSot×EMROWjt
WOMENdt/WOMENot×EMROWjt
Table 1 (2004-2009)
Vjojd
EPSdt/EPSot× EMROWjt
WOMENdt/WOMENot×EMROWjt
Table 2 (full sample)
OUTjdt
EPSdt×EMROWjt
WOMENdt×EMROWjt
Table 2 (1995-2000)
OUTjdt
EPSdt×EMROWjt
WOMENdt×EMROWjt
Table 2 (2004-2009)
OUTjdt
EPSdt×EMROWjt
WOMENdt×EMROWjt
Table 3 (full sample)
RCAINCadjjot
RCADVAadjjot
Table 3 (1995-2000)
RCAINCadjjot
RCADVAadjjot
Table 3 (2004-2009)
RCAINCadjjot
RCADVAadjjot

Observations

Mean

S.D.

Min.

Max.

182,265
182,700
182,700

12.9139
109.2618
119.4034

94.12131
94.75362
126.1251

0
6.999043
3.534235

6166.788
920.4393
1871.095

72,848
73,080
73,080

10.09504
105.2212
130.788

74.62005
79.54884
156.537

7.17e-06
10.87636
3.534235

5602.917
579.1866
1871.095

72,906
73,080
73,080

16.7302
116.8046
108.1828

115.2592
114.5718
91.7387

0
6.999043
6.196608

6166.788
920.4393
1009.291

6,299
6,300
6,300

3.2729
122.1166
1527.577

3.215449
70.22709
889.6209

.0093273
23.66389
142.7872

20.82284
383.5164
4472.149

2,520
2,520
2,520

3.208548
84.10601
1338.498

3.144884
43.84275
837.5786

.0093273
23.66389
142.7872

20.8027
241.3277
3965.971

2,519
2,520
2,520

3.327291
165.4455
1721.857

3.298382
75.77726
893.4468

.0339398
27.97388
292.9629

20.82284
383.5164
4472.149

6,285
6,289

1.822856
-9.025437

26.23925
36.63057

-88.59908
-100

75.57949
79.07862

2,512
2,509

2.484123
-8.319078

25.44502
36.13534

-88.59908
-97.03481

73.44331
79.07862

2,514
2,520

.6538354
-9.782039

27.08677
37.14433

-77.86648
-100

75.57949
77.7456
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Figure A1: Scatterplots of EPS index 1995-2009
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Figure A2: Scatterplots of the percentage of seats held by women in national parliaments 1995-2009
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Appendix B. Methodology
B.1 decomposing the value of final goods
The WIOD comprises 35 industries and 40 countries plus a model of the rest-of-the-world (Timmer, Dietzenbacher,
Los, Stehrer and de Vries 2015). For each year, we can describe the main structure of the input-output tables using
four matrices: a 1435×1435 intermediate transaction matrix Z, a 1×1435 value-added vector U, a 1435×1 gross output
vector X, and a 1435×1 final good vector Y. Additionally, we can obtain a 1435×1435 direct requirement matrix A
by dividing the entries of Z by the entries of X. In input-output analysis, all outputs must either be used either as
intermediate inputs or final demand (Miller and Blair 2009). Using matrix notations, we can express this condition as
X = AX + Y = (I−A)-1Y. In the second identity, (I−A)−1, known as the Leontief inverse matrix, shows the total inputs
directly and indirectly required to produce one unit of an industry’s output. The Leontief inverse matrix will be used
to decompose the value of final goods in global value chains:
V = Û(I−A)−1Ŷ. ⋯ (B1)

In Equation (B1), Û is a diagonal matrix, in which the main diagonal elements are the value-added to gross output
ratios by industry and country. Ŷ is also a diagonal matrix, in which the elements of the main diagonal are the value
of final goods by industry and country. In essence, the calculation traces all the value absorbed in an industry’s final
good to where they first originate in the global value chains (Johnson 2018). The entries of the resulting matrix V
correspond to Viojd in Equation (1) and Equation (2).
B.2 Calculating net domestic value-added in gross exports
In WIOD, the direct requirement matrix A comprises a series of submatrices. Each submatrix Aod identifies
intermediate linkages within a country (if d=o) and between two countries (if d≠o). Using Aoo, we can obtain a “local”
Leontief inverse matrix (I−Aoo)−1. Then, we can calculate the net domestic value-added embodied in country o’s gross
exports using the following equation:
NDVAo = Ûo(I−Aoo)−1Eo. ⋯ (B2)

In Equation (B2), Ûo is a diagonal matrix, in which entries on the main diagonal are country o’s value-added to output
ratios. Eo contains country o’s gross exports by industry. The resulting vector NDVAo shows the net domestic valueadded in country o’s gross exports by industry, i.e., NDVAjo in Equation (4). The calculation is done with the icio
statistical package developed by Belotti, Borin and Mancini (2020) and Borin and Mancini (2019).
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